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Abstract

Current Air Force supply doctrine requires the management of large numbers of
spare parts in Mobility Readiness Spares Packages (MRSPs). The MRSPs are usually
designed to support deployed aircraft for the first 30 days of a conflict, and can be quite
large. When units from several bases deploy to the same operating location, they each
bring their full MRSP. This results in a large logistics footprint that may be reduced by
taking a system-level approach.
This thesis examined the impact of centralized MRSP management on kit size and
cost. The Aircraft Sustainability Model (ASM) computer program was used to evaluate
MRSPs for F-15C, C-17A, and B-52H aircraft deploying in both the traditional manner
and with customized MRSPs from a centralized facility.
The results of the ASM analysis indicate there is a significant cost and size
savings when MRSPs are customized for the total number of aircraft deployed to a region
of conflict. While the size of the savings varied between aircraft and flying hour profiles,
MRSPs from the centralized facility always provided the same level of support for less
cost. The results show the Air Force could release spare parts locked up in standardized
MRSPs and relieve some of the current spares shortages without degrading unit
readiness.

ANALYSIS OF THE EFFECT OF CENTRALIZING MANAGEMENT OF MOBILITY
READINESS SPARES PACKAGE ASSETS

I. Introduction

Background
The United States military is facing a world that is changing more rapidly than
ever before. With the Cold War over and the elimination of the Soviet threat, America's
armed forces are no longer able to point their collective fingers and say "There's the
enemy, let's start planning." Congress and the American people have proclaimed a
"peace dividend" and have scaled back funding of defense programs and budgets. At the
same time, they have set the standards to which the military must size itself and have
called for ever-increasing involvement in military operations other than warfare
(MOOTW). These small-scale contingencies and humanitarian relief efforts actually task
our forces more than a major theater war (MTW) ever would (AMSP: 1.4.2).
An aging fleet of heavy airlift aircraft, primarily the C-141 Starlifter, has put new
constraints on the Air Force's ability to deploy forces anywhere in the world at a
moment's notice. In a June 2000 report, the GAO stated that the Air Force could not
meet the requirements for a two major theater war scenario because there is an estimated
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29% shortfall in cargo airlift capacity (GAO report, 2000: 5). The C-17 Globemaster III
is the replacement for the C-141. While it carries substantially more cargo than the C141 and can land on unimproved runaways, Congress has funded only 120 C-17 aircraft
to replace 266 C-141s. The theoretical airlift capacity remains about equal, but the loss
of flexibility inherent in possessing only half the airframes means the remaining aircraft
must be used more efficiently.

Mobility Readiness Spares Packages
Most conflicts in the world occur far from peacetime operating locations. When
Air Force units are called up, a massive logistics effort by air, ground, and sea moves the
units into forward locations where they must be supported until the conflict is resolved.
The Air Force supports the initial deployment by sending spares in standardized
containers. The initial cache of spares is designed to support the deployed aircraft until a
resupply pipeline can be established. In the past, this time period was assumed to be 30
days at the most. In reality, advances in transportation technology and the rise of rapid
air transport have reduced the pipeline setup time significantly.
Current Air Force supply doctrine requires the management of large numbers of
spare parts in Mobility Readiness Spares Packages (MRSPs). The kits, as they are also
known, are usually configured to support a given number of aircraft for a set amount of
time, usually 30 days. They are designed with the assumption that no resupply takes
place during the first 30 days. The packages can be quite large, with between 15 and 20
conexes (large containers for parts) plus wheel and tire pallets.

There is a general belief that too many parts are stored in the MRSPs. The author
witnessed this during Operation PHOENIX SCORPION IV (Air Mobility Command's
support of the deployment of US forces to the Persian Gulf), in which a large C-17 kit
was deployed for nearly a month and had only a few parts issued during the entire
operation. The resulting large logistics footprint places a strain on already overburdened
airlift capacity, so the current direction of research is to determine how to reduce the
number of parts necessary for the initial deployment. The base-level maintenance,
inventory, and personnel support requirements are also significant when maintaining
large numbers of assets ready to deploy in less than 24 hours.
MRSPs possess a higher fill priority than regular peacetime operating stock (POS)
assets at base level. When a reparable asset arrives on base, the base supply system
checks for requirements and fills them based on the priorities assigned to the backorders.
Outstanding backorders for the maintenance organizations are satisfied first, then MRSP
backorders, and finally POS requirements (AFM 23-110: 2001, V2P2C9.40.3.4). Often,
there are not enough assets to meet all the requirements due to the previously mentioned
funding shortfalls. The result is that bases are forced to "live out of the kits," and baselevel POS requirements remain empty. The situation causes constant shuffling of assets
between the MRSP location and the flightline delivery location, and increases the
probability of inventory inaccuracies and longer delivery times.

Reparable Asset Pipeline
The Air Force uses a multi-echelon inventory system to manage reparable assets.
A multi-echelon system is one in which assets are warehoused in a hierarchy of locations.

Reparable assets are those items that are economically feasible to repair rather than
dispose of when they become unserviceable through use. In general, reparable assets are
expensive and thus are in much shorter supply than consumable items. The Air Force
attempts to manage reparable assets in a way that balances inventory levels with desired
aircraft availability levels for a set budget.
Reparable assets enter the Air Force inventory through acquisition channels, and
are managed by depots located throughout the U.S. The depots support bases with
aircraft that use the items by allocating the assets in a way that maximizes total system
aircraft availability. Assets may be stored at the depot only, at bases only, or in a
combination of depot and base supply stock. Unserviceable assets are returned to the
depot for repair or disposal. This return loop makes the model a cyclic one, where
inventory is not lost or renewed, except in extreme cases where an asset becomes
economically unfeasible to repair. The demand in cyclic reparable models is driven by
failure and repair events (Diaz and Fu, 2000: 7).

Items of Evaluation
The individual indicators Air Force managers examine are MRSP fill rates, NotMission-Capable-Supply (NMCS) rates, and aircraft availability. A fill rate is expressed
as a percentage of the parts in the MRSP compared to what the MRSP is authorized to
have. There are no mandated lower limits on fill rates during peacetime, but resupply to
the kits is always a higher priority than regular operating stock at a base. The NMCS rate
is the percentage of aircraft that are grounded due to lack of a specific part or parts.

Aircraft availability is the final measure of all logistics activity, and is the percentage of
aircraft ready to fly and fight (Larvick, 2000: 13).
MRSPs are usually "robusted" before deployments, meaning they are inventoried
and then stocked to the highest fill rate possible using parts from other, non-deploying
kits. So, while the average fill rate during peacetime may be low, they are usually
deployed with a higher fill rate than normal. Fill rate should not be the only measure of
MRSP effectiveness because there are times when critical assets are not available in the
kit and the aircraft may be grounded for parts, even if the MRSP has a 99% fill rate
(Larvick, 2000:13). For this reason, the newer models used for analyzing kit
effectiveness use aircraft availability as the final measure of customer service.

Issue
Several methods of reducing the size of MRSPs have attracted attention. They
include reducing the MRSP resupply pipeline time, improving in-transit visibility, and
establishing Consolidated Intermediate Repair Facilities (CIRFs). The 30-day
configuration is a Cold War era paradigm that is currently being reevaluated. The
question many supply mangers are asking today is what is the most effective way to
allocate spares to Mobility Readiness Spares Packages (MRSPs or kits) supporting AEF
deployments? This thesis will address a new answer: that of centralizing the kits at
regional centers and then building up focused MRSPs when deployments occur. The
following figures illustrate the differences between the current and proposed modes of
operation:

f

Depot

\^

V

Repair

J

Unserviceable Süares

Figure 1: Traditional MRSP Management Model

Figure 2: Proposed MRSP Management Model
The basic premise behind the concept is simple: if multiple squadrons of identical
aircraft deploy to the same Forward Operating Location (FOL), they would normally take
a standard MRSP from each base. The FOL would then have multiple squadrons of
aircraft with multiple full MRSPs. For example, if two 24-aircraft squadrons from
different bases deploy to the same FOL, they would take two full MRSPs in support.
During the Gulf War in 1990-91, a 24-plane fighter squadron required the equivalent of

20 C-141 loads to deploy (Snyder, et al, 1998:16). The MRSP is not the total load, but is
a significant portion of the footprint. Forty C-141 loads would be required to deploy the
hypothetical two squadrons. When they arrived at the FOL, the number of hours it would
take to set up and the amount of storage space the MRSPs require would be considerable.
The number of aircraft at deployed locations today is small; several 6 to 12
aircraft units deployed throughout the theater are becoming common. A CIRF is set up at
a central point and a main support warehouse is established to feed parts to the dispersed
units. This is a change from the large, 50+ aircraft deployments the Air Force has
historically deployed.

Research Question
This thesis will determine what, if any, savings can be gained from centralized
management of MRSP assets. The premise behind this statement is that of economies of
scope: a single MRSP designed to support 48 aircraft should be smaller than two MRSPs
designed to support 24 aircraft each.

Investigative Questions
The following investigative questions have been developed to direct the research
and help answer the thesis question.
1. How does the Air Force currently determine MRSP requirements?
2. What model/models are used to build up MRSPs?
3. What are the relevant theories about centralized inventory management?

4. Are any other military services using centralized management to reduce costs
and/or logistics footprint?
5. What is the effect of customized MRSP creation at a central location?

Scope

The research will examine only the effects of centralizing the management of
MRSPs for F-15C, C-17A, and B-52H aircraft. No reduction in pipeline times will be
assumed for the scenarios. That research is an ongoing effort by numerous others and
will not be addressed here. The thesis will not discuss the political ramifications of
removing local base MRSP assets. Base operations routinely use MRSP assets for dayto-day flight operations, and removing them, even for the purpose of returning more
assets to regular POS, would need higher headquarters' approval. This thesis will only
evaluate the potential savings that may result from such a decision.

Summary

This chapter has provided a general introduction to the topic and defined the
research questions to be answered in the study. Chapter two is a literature review, and
will further explore previous work and explain some concepts vital to the understanding
of the thesis. Chapter three will explain the methodology used and the operation of the
Aircraft Sustainability Model (ASM). Chapter four will discuss the results and any
conclusions to be made. Finally, chapter five will wrap up the thesis with a final
discussion and any further research suggestions.
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II. Chapter 2-Literature Review

Military forces throughout the ages have recognized that an army without good
logistics support is destined to fight a very short war. This literature review will provide
some background needed to understand the ideas behind the thesis. The review will first
discuss the progression of inventory management techniques from simple ones to more
complex dynamic, multi-echelon models. It will then examine MRSP characteristics and
factors that affect the ASM computations. It will finish with a discussion of centralized
inventory management theory and a look at a Navy program that uses centralized assets
to improve support.

Inventory Management Techniques
The task of reducing the amount of inventory necessary to achieve a desired level
of availability has prompted many studies. This section will start with the most basic
methods and models and proceed to the more complicated and recent models. The
relevance of mathematical models to this study precludes the inclusion of other methods
such as neural networks and queuing models.
Simple Pipeline. The simple single base repair pipeline consists of four components
through which the reparable asset passes. When a part on an aircraft fails, it is removed
and sent to through the base repair cycle process to the repair shop. At the same time, a
serviceable part, if available, is sent to the aircraft for installation. Figure 3 shows this
simple model and the path a part takes through it.

'Serviceable Stock

Repair Shop"
Base
Repair
Cycle

BASE

t

SERVICEABLE

UNSERVICEABLE

Figure 3: Simple Pipeline (Arostegui, 2000)

For this model, there are two major factors we are concerned with. The first is the Daily
Demand Rate (DDR), and the second is the Repair Cycle Time (RCT). The DDR is
simply the number of demands an item receives per day. For example, if the base shows
the number of orders for a quarter is 65, then the DDR for the part is 65/120, or .542.
The repair cycle time is determined by the base repair facility, and may be different for
each part. In the simple model, no parts are ever condemned (the system is conservative).
In addition, we assume every part is essential, so a part missing downs the aircraft. No
cannibalization activities are permitted, so each aircraft has only one part removed.
With the model defined, we now turn to calculating the number of spare parts we
expect to be in the pipeline on average. This is simply the DDR multiplied by the RCT.
If we assume the RCT is five days, then the Pipeline Quantity (PLQ) is .542*5, or 2.71
parts in the repair pipeline at any given moment in time. This model is very simplistic,
and does not represent the majority of inventory systems operating in the real world. It
does provide a good starting point from which to build a suitably applicable model. The
vast majority of inventory systems are multi-echelon systems, with multiple levels of
inventory.
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Multi-echelon Networks. Clark states that multi-echelon theory is "concerned with a
variety of inventory problems involving two or more interrelated supply or production
facilities (Clark, 1972: 621)." Many inventory systems in the civilian sector involve the
flow of consumables from factories to distribution centers and then on to points of
consumption. This common type of network is referred to as an "arborescent" or
inverted tree structure (Clark, 1972: 622).

FACTORY

REGIONAL
DISTRIBUTORS

CENTRAL

WEST

LOCAL
DISTRIBUTORS

57?- 6V- 6V- öV-<y- <fc'
FIGURE

1.

RETAIL
STORES

Distribution system for a grocery product

Figure 4: Arborescent Structure (Clark: 1972)

It is important to note that the above structure may change for every item. A different
factory may produce the item, or an entirely different distribution network may be in
place.
The levels within the arborescent structure are generally referred to as echelons,
so any network with numerous levels is called a multi-echelon network. While this
works for consumable items with no return loop, Clark argues that the nomenclature is
too restrictive to be used in a general sense (Clark, 1972: 622). However, the general
trend in the literature suggests that most authors are comfortable with using the term
"multi-echelon" when discussing any network with more than one level.
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A simple Air Force example of a multi-echelon network involves the addition of a
depot to our first model, as shown in Figure 5 below:

Repair Shop

Depot

Serviceable Stod

DEPOT

Repair
Cycle

1

mmmmmmmmmmmmmmmammmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmammitlmm

Repair Shop
Base
Repair
Cycle

Serviceable Stocl

BASE

f

„vicrpvi^AD.t:

gPPVTnPARTH

Figure 5: Simple Multi-Echelon Network (Arostegui, 2000)

In addition to the base repair pipeline, the network now has a repair and resupply
pipeline to and from the second echelon, the depot. Items that cannot be repaired at the
base repair shop are sent into the depot repair cycle. The time it takes an item to move
from the base to the depot is called the retrograde time (RET). The depot repair shop will
take some amount of time to repair the item, which is the depot repair time (DRT). At
the same time an item leaves the base, the base orders a replacement from the depot using
an (S-l, S) inventory model where a part is ordered for every unserviceable part that
leaves the base. If the depot has assets the time it takes for the order to arrive at the
depot, be processed, and then be shipped to the base is known as the order and ship time
(OST).
12

To determine the amount of stock in the pipeline for the above model, the percent
base repair (PBR) needs to be calculated. This is simply the number of items repaired
this station (RTS) divided by the total number of demands for the item. The base repair
cycle quantity is then:
RCQ = DDRxRCTxPBR (1)
The OST quantity is simply the DDR multiplied by the number of demands sent to the
depot (1-PBR) times the OST:
OSTQ = DDR(\ - PBR) x OST (2)
The depot RCQ is a modification of the base RCQ that adjusts for the percent of items
sent to the depot:
DRCQ = DDR(\-PBR)xDRT (3)
The retrograde pipeline quantity is found with the following equation:
RPQ = DDR(l-PBR)xRET (4)
Finally, the average number of items in the total pipeline (the total system requirement
(TSR)) at any given time is the sum of the individual pipeline quantities:
TSR = BaseRCQ + DepotRCQ + OSTQ + DRCQ + RPQ (5)
The model above can be made even more complex by adding condemnation rates
or other variables to the mix. One item to note is that the quantities used are generally
averages taken over several periods, and usually vary over time. To compensate, a safety
level is usually established using some pre-specified formula. In addition, this model
must be applied to every item in the inventory and seeks only to optimize the service
level of a particular item instead of the entire system. For that, a system-wide multiechelon inventory management technique must be used.
13

Types of Multi-echelon Models. There are many ways of formulating multi-echelon
models in response to the different data types and behaviors of the network being
modeled. Clark outlines six dichotomies that he says help distinguish the various types:
Table 1: Types of Multi-echelon Models (Adapted from Clark, 1972)
Stochastic
Deterministic
Demands known within a given probability
External demands at each activity are
distribution (or conditional distribution)
known in advance
Multiple-Product
Single-Product
Deals with more than one products
Deals only with one product at a time,
simultaneously, attempts to optimize based
ignores possible interactions
on one or more criteria such as budget
Nonstationary
Stationary
Parameters defining external demands may
Parameters defining external demands
change over time
considered to be independent of time
Periodic Review
Continuous Review
Opportunities to review stock position and Opportunities to review stock position and
implement policies occur at discrete points
implement policies occur continuously
Reparable Product
Consumable Product
All issued items are permanent losses to the Some or all of the items issued are
regenerated as items that may be reissued
system
No Backlog
Backlog
Unsatisfied demands are not retained and
Unsatisfied demands are retained and
are assumed lost to the system
satisfied from later resupply
Using Clark's criteria, the models previously examined are deterministic, singleproduct models with stationary demand. They are subject to continuous review, deal
with reparable items only, and may or may not consider backorders. In a more recent
article, Diaz and Fu uphold Clark's taxonomy, substituting the terms "cyclic" and
"acyclic" for reparable and consumable types of flow, respectively (Diaz and Fu, 2000:
8).
Probabilistic Models. It is generally assumed (though not usually specifically stated)
that a system-perspective model performs better than a single-item model. In 1968,
Sherbrooke published an article in Operations Research titled "METRIC: A MultiEchelon Technique for Recoverable Item Control." Diaz and Fu call METRIC "the most
14

influential model by far (Diaz and Fu, 2000: 9)." They state that METRIC was
interesting for two main reasons. The first was that Sherbrooke used exchange curves of
system availability versus investment value of spares, instead of finding a single
"optimal" value. The second reason is that he allocated spares based on a global basis.
Further research by Muckstadt and Thomas showed that simple multi-echelon models
such as METRIC do yield better results than a simple naive local optimization
(Muckstadt and Thomas, 1980: 494). This section will provide an overview of the
METRIC model and some of the more advanced developments based on METRIC.
Diaz and Fu (2000,10) describe key relationships they say form the basis for
analyzing multi-echelon models for repairable items. They break down the process into
three general steps:
1. Determine the distributions for the parts population through the various
components of the system
2. Combine the distributions to determine backorder distributions
3. Determine availability from the backorder distributions
In addition, they consider a system of a single base and a single depot, each with a
specific target of spares. They represent the system as a network of discrete elements,
including:
1. a stock of working-level parts (installed parts on aircraft)
2. a base-to-repair facility pipeline for failed parts
3. a repair facility
4. a depot storage facility stocking more spares

15

5. a depot-to-base pipeline
6. a base storage facility stocking spares (base supply)
Using this basic framework, Sherbrooke developed the METRIC model, which was
quickly adopted by the military as a means of maximizing aircraft availability at a given
budget level. We now discuss the METRIC model in detail.
METRIC. METRIC is an extension of the single-site model with two echelons of repair
and resupply. It adds multiple bases to the system. It is a single-indenture model, which
means that each part is a line replaceable unit (LRU) with no shop replaceable units
(SRU). This simplifies the model but is not especially accurate because many reparable
parts have smaller reparable parts installed on them (SRUs), and a lack of SRUs can
significantly impact repair times. METRIC is a stationary, stochastic model that
addresses multi-echelon, multi-item, multi-location systems. Its goal is to minimize
expected backorders (EBO) (Arostegui, 2000).
METRIC uses several assumptions to make the computational effort less tedious.
For base repairs, the decision to repair does not depend on the stock levels or workload.
This means that if the base has the capability to repair a failed item, it will do so.
Maintenance workload is not a factor. In terms of resupply, METRIC assumes bases
receive assets from the depot only. No lateral resupply from other bases is allowed. This
assumption makes sense because stock replenishment actions from the depot should be
routine. Lateral resupply involves additional costs that are not easily incorporated into
the model, and in practice lateral resupply is only a small fraction of the bases' business.
The stockage policy at every echelon is an (S-l, S) policy (also known as a one-for-one
policy). There is no batching of units for repair and no batching of resupply requests.

16

Because the items exhibit low annual demand and high unit cost, the classic economic
order quantity (EOQ) formula would yield a recommended order quantity of one.
Because the model is stationary, METRIC assumes that the number of aircraft operated
and their flying hours will remain fairly constant over the near-term. METRIC also
assumes the system is conservative and therefore does not account for condemnations of
assets.
One very important aspect of the METRIC model is that it minimizes the
expected backorders for the entire system. Therefore, a base backorder lasting 10 days is
treated just a seriously as 10 one-day backorders. This may or may not be a good
characteristic, depending on the commander's perspective. Is it better to have 10 aircraft
down for one day, or one aircraft down for 10? The final assumption for METRIC is that
demand data from different bases can be pooled. Figure 6 shows the METRIC model in
schematic form.
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Figure 6 METRIC Network (Arostegui, 2000)

Mod-METRIC. In 1973, Muckstadt published an article in Management Science titled
"A Model for a Multi-Item, Multi-Echelon, Multi-Indenture Inventory System." In it,
Muckstadt expanded the METRIC model to accommodate the effects of SRU backorders
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on the system. Again, the overall goal was to minimize expected backorders. The figure
below shows the Mod-METRIC network for a single base.
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Figure 7: Mod-METRIC Network (Arostegui, 2000)

As shown in the diagram, Mod-METRIC adds a pipeline segment for base repair
of SRUs and for the depot resupply of SRUs to the bases. In addition, base repair of an
LRU may be delayed/impacted due to the lack of an SRU. One of the more important
concepts behind Mod-METRIC is while the lack of a serviceable LRU grounds an
aircraft, the lack of a serviceable SRU delays the LRU's repair.
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Mod-METRIC was originally designed for the F-15's two F-100 engines. These
engines are modular, with modules such as the inlet/fan module, the core engine, the fan
drive turbine module, and the augmenter/exhaust nozzle module. When an engine fails,
the engine is removed and replaced with a serviceable engine. The failed engine is then
tested and the offending module is replaced. The module may be repaired at the base or
the depot. In extreme cases, the entire engine is sent to the depot for repair. Despite
being developed for this specific purpose, Mod-METRIC is generalizeable to many
applications involving both LRUs and SRUs.
Mod-METRIC uses the basic METRIC assumptions and then adds several of its
own. The model assumes that LRUs are expensive and directly degrade the mission
when they fail, so the system should have a PBR close to 100%. In contrast, SRUs are
relatively inexpensive and are remove and replace items. Some PBR for them is
acceptable, but the system can more readily afford to have extra stock of the items and
fill the depot repairable pipeline with them. Mod-METRIC assumes that every LRU
failure is the result of just one SRU failure, with no "cascading failures" allowed.
Finally, an SRU belongs to just one LRU (Arostegui, 2000).
In 1985, Graves published a paper that criticized the METRIC models for their
use of the Poisson distribution for demands. He and others found that both METRIC and
Mod-METRIC understated actual EBO values. Sherbrooke agreed, stating:
"When the METRIC model was developed, it was clear that it understated base
backorders. In most cases the error was not large, and the simplicity of METRIC
seemed to overshadow its lack of precision (Sherbrooke, 1986: 311)."
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Slay in 1980 developed the VARI-METRIC model, which resulted in a ten-fold
improvement over METRIC results. Using the model, Graves found that METRIC
differed by at least one unit in 11% of the cases he examined. VARI-METRIC differed
in only 1% of the cases (Arostegui, 2000). Sherbrooke further refined Slay's algorithm in
1986 and published it in an article in Operations Research titled "VARI-METRIC:
Improved Approximations for Multi-Indenture, Multi-Echelon Availability Models."
VARI-METRIC. The METRIC models are known as first-order models because they
use simple averages to compute the number of units in the pipeline. VARI-METRIC is
known as a second-order model because it uses both the mean and variance to compute
the number of units in resupply. The network is the same as the Mod-METRIC model
depicted in Figure 7.
VARI-METRIC is a stationary, stochastic demand model that deals with multiechelon, multi-item, multi-location, multi-indenture systems. Its goal is to maximize
system-wide aircraft availability. It assumes an (S-l, S) inventory policy at every
echelon. As was the case with METRIC, repair capacity and parts are plentiful so repair
time is independent of the number of units already in repair. It assumes a Poisson
demand with a mean that is constant, but uses the negative binomial distribution for the
base backorder process. No units are condemned, and no lateral resupply occurs between
bases. The chart below shows the difference between the Poisson and negative binomial
distributions. The negative binomial approximates the backorder distribution in a more
realistic manner (Arostegui, 2000).
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Figure 8: Negative Binomial vs. Poisson (Arostegui, 2000)

Dyna-METRIC. Peacetime flight operations provide a fairly stationary demand
pattern for which to model inventory systems. The military environment, however,
possesses several dynamic factors that necessitate the addition of dynamic processing
capabilities. Wartime aircraft flying rates and support capabilities may fluctuate rapidly
during a conflict. In addition, deploying aircraft usually leave some organic maintenance
and resupply capabilities behind, and these take some time to "catch up" to the aircraft.
Dyna-METRIC was developed to address these issues. The RAND organization
developed a series of projects aimed at improving aircraft readiness and supportability,
and these were used to develop and enhance the Dyna-METRIC model. Various releases
of the model have been designed to support specific Air Force requirements. The first
four releases were analytical models, while the last two are simulation-based. The
analytical releases can assess the effect of different logistics scenarios, or compute spares
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requirements to achieve specific availability goals. The simulation models can only
provide assessments.
The Dyna-METRIC model is a stochastic, dynamic demand model that deals with
multi-item, multi-location, multi-echelon, multi-indenture systems and attempts to
maximize aircraft availability. The next section lists the assumptions the Dyna-METRIC
model makes.
While similar to the METRIC models, Dyna-METRIC removes even more of the
restrictive assumptions found in basic METRIC formulations. It assumes the LRU
demands are proportional to either flying hours or sortie rate, and that demands arrive
randomly based on some known mean and variance with either a Poisson or negative
binomial distribution. In addition, repair and transportation times have known
probability distributions, and there is unconstrained repair capability. Again, no lateral
resupply takes place. All aircraft deployed to a single base are identical. In a major
change to the previous METRIC models, cannibalization actions where holes in aircraft
are consolidated are allowed. Dyna-METRIC assumes that "canns" occur instantly and
that the ability to cann an LRU is either possible or not with no intermediate levels.
The simulation releases of Dyna-METRIC relax some of the assumptions further.
Lateral resupply is allowed, and repair scheduling can take place on a priority basis. In
addition, depot condemnation is allowed and battle damage of repair facilities can be
modeled. However, because the model is a simulation, it cannot build a spares
requirements list to achieve target goals (Arostegui, 2000).
Aircraft Sustainability Model (ASM). ASM was developed by LMI to provide a
system-level approach in selecting spares mixes (Kline, et al, 1999: 1-2). ASM is a

23

stochastic, dynamic demand model that deals with multi-item, multi-location, multiechelon, multi-indenture systems and attempts to maximize aircraft availability. It has
the same assumptions as the Dyna-METRIC model. It also has the ability to both build
an MRSP based on requirements and then evaluate that kit (or others) over a multi-day
analysis period.
Kline, et al (1999) list seven factors in addition to aircraft availability and budget
restraints. The first is item type. ASM was primarily developed to deal with high-cost,
essential items, usually reparable in nature. It can, however, deal with consumable item
that are generally lower-cost, throw-away items. Second, ASM deals with the indenture
structure of the aircraft by examining both LRU and SRU pipelines and determining the
impact of each. Third, common items, which are used on more than one type of aircraft,
are also considered. This allows ASM to consider the impact of a ready pool of available
assets for other aircraft. This does not have as large an impact on MRSP calculations,
however, because MRSPs assume no resupply from outside the operating location. The
fourth factor is cannibalization. As we will discuss later, ASM can model the
consolidation of needed parts into the fewest aircraft possible in several ways.
The fifth factor ASM deals with is wartime vs. non-wartime conditions. Policies
and flying hour requirements are vastly different during wartime than in peacetime. The
sixth factor is the existence of starting stock where asset may already have been
purchased. ASM incorporates these values into the shopping list for the optimal mix of
spares. The final factor is a catchall that includes a number of item-specific factors such
as demand rate, base and depot repair times, condemnation rates, and others (Kline, et al,
1999: 1-4). Together, they make up the flexible and powerful package that is ASM.

24

MRSP Characteristics and Components
The makeup of an MRSP is the result of a multitude of different factors. Policy
decisions concerning flying rates and acceptable numbers of NMCS aircraft combine
with known item factors to create an MRSP that is designed for a specific purpose. ASM
uses these and other factors to compute an optimally sized kit that will support a unit for
a specific cost at a specific availability level. This section will describe some of the most
important factors and how ASM uses them to build an MRSP.
Range and Depth. The assets in an MRSP have a range and a depth designed to
support the unit. The range is the number of unique assets in the kit, and the depth is the
total number of each unique asset. For example, an MRSP may have 1000 unique items
(the range) but have 1200 total items because it has more than one of some items. AFR
400-24 (War Reserve Policy) states that the composition of the MRSP is a product of the
configuration, tasking, initial deployed maintenance capability, programmed arrival time
of any planned follow-on maintenance units, and programmed supply support concepts
for the specific MRSP (AFR 400-24: 24). When ASM uses these factors in the analysis,
the range and depth are the result.
Maintenance Concept. As previously discussed, assets may be divided into LRUs and
SRUs. LRUs can be further divided into remove/replace (RR) or remove/repair/replace
(RRR) items. The maintenance concept at the operating location determines how ASM
treats the two types of LRUs. In particular, the concept of a CIRF is designed to allow
RRR items to be repaired closer to the operating location and also to centralize the repair
facilities and thus reduce the total number of SRUs in the system. Planners designing kits
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using ASM must consider exactly what the maintenance capabilities of the operating
location will be and what impact that will have on the depth of parts in the MRSP.
Direct Support Objective. In the past, the direct support objective (DSO) was focused
only on day 30 of the war. This was a result of a "consumable" outlook, which basically
implied that having enough of an item on day 30 meant there was enough of the item on
days prior to that (Mattern, 1993: 2-2). For reparable assets, however, this assumption
may not be correct. A typical wartime scenario includes a "surge" period followed by a
longer sustainment period, as shown in this example:

Sorties per
day per
squadron

55

Sortie capability with DSO = 18 aircraft

50
Tasking

25

30
Day of war

Figure 9: Dual DSO Concept (Mattern, 1993: 2-4)
As shown above, a DSO of 18 aircraft meets the requirement at day 30, but does not meet
the requirement for the first eight days of the war. This prompted the Air Force to
consider and adopt the concept of dual DSOs: one for the end of the surge period, and
one for the sustainment period at the end of the war. ASM has the capability to use the
dual DSO concept in its calculations.
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The DSO directly affects the range and depth of spares in the MRSP. Reducing
the DSO will reduce the number of spares purchased. This will also reduce the logistics
footprint and airlift capacity needed to support the aircraft. The downside is that a when
a DSO is reduced then the number of airframes available for mission planners is also
reduced. Planners must determine the correct tradeoff that balances logistics footprint
with mission success. DSOs vary by aircraft type and mission, and are defined in the
War Mobilization Plan (WMP).
Flying Hour Requirements. The WMP also defines the flying hour requirements for
the unit undergoing analysis. ASM uses the total flying hours per day during both the
surge and sustainment periods to determine what assets will be necessary. The heavier
the flying hour requirement, the more parts will be needed to maintain the desired DSO
for the period.
Cannibalization. Cannibalization is a maintenance action taken when all other sources
of parts have been exhausted. It involves removing items from one aircraft to place on
another, and its effect is to consolidate "holes" in aircraft so more airframes are mission
capable. Canning is an important consideration when running ASM because it is a realworld option and is used extensively during operations. Newer weapon systems such as
the F-16 and F-15 have even been designed to make cannibalization easier (Arostegui,
2000). This section will discuss some assumptions about canning and look at an
example.
ASM makes a number of assumptions with respect to cannibalization actions.
First, it assumes that all cann actions take place at the operating base. No parts are
canned from one aircraft at a base and then shipped to another base. Second, ASM
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assumes items either may or may not be canned, with no regard to how easy or hard the
cann action is. ASM has three options: cann all LRUs, cann LRUs according to their
cann flag in the item properties, or do not cann any LRUs. ASM assumes that SRUs are
always canned in the backshops when necessary (Kline, et al, 1999: 50).
Cannibalization has a large impact on the range and depth of assets in the MRSP.
In essence, it provides yet another warehouse for assets at the operating location, so if
cannibalization is allowed the number of parts required will be reduced. It also relaxes
the somewhat cumbersome assumption that only one part is missing from each NMCS
aircraft.
Item Characteristics. Every item ASM considers for inclusion in the MRSP has a set
of factors that ASM uses to determine its optimal spares mix. Perhaps the most important
factor is the daily demand rate of the item, which was discussed earlier in this chapter.
Using the demand rate and repair cycle times, ASM can determine pipeline quantities.
Depot variables such as the order and ship time (OST) and depot repair times are
considered. Each item has a cannibalization flag (yes or no) and a quantity per aircraft
(QPA) that tells ASM how many are needed and how many can be cannibalized if
necessary. These and other factors are unique to each item and ASM takes each into
account and balances them all to arrive at the solution. The final factor of interest to
ASM is the item cost, which it uses to establish a shopping list which purchases items
based on their contribution to aircraft availability (Kline, et al, 1999: 1-2). Planners use
the list to purchase maximum aircraft availability for the allowable budget. For a more
detailed examination of the item factors ASM uses, please see "Optimizing Spares
Support: the Aircraft Sustainability Model," by Slay, et al (1999).
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Centralized Inventory Management
A relatively new idea known as risk pooling advocates the centralization of
inventory to reduce overhead and inventory investment costs. There are three critical
points to consider in a risk pooling scenario:
1. Centralizing inventory reduces safety stock and average inventory. This point
implies that if demand is high in one area of the market, then it usually is lower in
another, so a centralized warehouse can reallocate assets faster than a noncentralized one. The military follows this concept to some extent, canceling
lower-priority missions to sustain high operations tempo in other areas.
2. The second point deals with the coefficient of variation, which is the standard
deviation divided by the average demand (Simchi-Levi, et al, 2000: 57). The
higher this coefficient is, the greater the benefit of risk pooling will be. This is
due to the fact that safety stock calculations are almost always based on the
standard deviation. The greater the reduction in safety stock, the greater the
overall benefit will be.
3. The final point is that the benefits of risk pooling depend on how highly
correlated the demand in the markets are (Simchi-Levi, et al, 2000: 60). If the
demands are highly correlated, then they will rise and fall together, and no offset
of demand by reallocating assets will be possible. In a military setting, this would
be equivalent to fighting a major theater war in both Asia and the Middle East at
the same time. The reality for the near future is more likely that of small-scale
contingencies in a few locations or a single major deployment covered by an
AEF.
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Bases currently stock MRSPs built for scenarios defined in the WMP, which are then
adjusted before deployment for the actual scenario expected. Each base stocks and
maintains their own kits. The risk pooling theory states that a centralized management
facility with some portion of the total would result in reduced overhead and inventory
investment while still maintaining the same level of support. The Navy recently used
centralized management to accomplish this result.

A Navy Example
The Navy faces some of the same types of logistics footprint problems the Air
Force does. They also face two additional problems: their ships have less warehouse
space than the typical deployed location, and logistics response times are greater because
the parts' destination is constantly moving. To improve the support for the Tomahawk
Land Attack Missile (TLAM) Afloat Planning System (APS), the Navy turned to
contractor logistics support. The Defense Logistics Agency and Federal Express
(FEDEX) developed a logistics support system that significantly reduced costs while
providing better support. The relevance to this thesis is that the improvement was
accomplished through centralized inventory management and high-speed transit.
The USS Carl Vinson was the test ship for the new system. Typically, the ship
deployed with a range of 237 and a depth of 535 parts for the APS. This kit of spares
was valued in excess of $1 million. Under the new system, the Carl Vinson deployed
with 40 parts having a value of $ 195,818. All other parts are stored at a GovernmentOwned/Contractor Operated facility in Memphis, TN. The average transit time for parts
requested via the internet from the central facility to the ship was 61/2 days; far better
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than the published Navy time frame of 32 days. When the report we reviewed was
published, nine afloat users and six ashore customers using the system had reported a
total cost avoidance of $12,680,000. FEDEX maintains a 99% inventory accuracy rate
and boasts an impressive 99% on-time delivery rate as well. Through this centralization
of assets, the Navy has improved response time, reduced inventory, and increased afloat
storage space (Navy Acquisition Reform Website, 2000).
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III. Chapter 3—Methodology

Overview
This chapter discusses the tools and techniques used to answer the central thesis
question. It begins with a summary statement of the problem and then examines the data
sets used to accomplish the analysis. It finishes with a discussion of the assumptions
made, the scenarios used, and the use of the ASM model for the thesis question.

Problem Summary
The purpose of this research is to determine if centralized management of MRSP
assets would result in an overall savings without sacrificing availability levels in the
process. To simulate this, imagine two different deployments. In the first, two squadrons

Operating Location

Figure 10: Traditional vs. Proposed Management

of aircraft deploy with their own individual MRSP to the same location and commence
operations. There are two kits brought from different bases but having the same amount
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of parts in each. In the second scenario, the two squadrons deploy to the same base, but
their kit comes from a central location and is built to sustain both squadrons' aircraft at
the same time. The figure above illustrates this. At first, it appears the added storage
facility will increase costs, but it is important to remember that each base has a War
Readiness Element staffed by supply personnel to manage the kits. Often, part-time
personnel augment these elements, which reduces manpower in there primary sections as
well. Additionally, this thesis will attempt to show that the inventory reductions gained
by centralizing the kits are substantial and justify the setup costs of the central facilities.

Data
This research is focused at reducing the logistics footprint of deployed aircraft.
As such, three different weapon system types were chosen to represent their roles:
fighter, airlifter, and bomber. The F-15C, C-17A, and B-52H, respectively, were selected
based on their typical wartime roles. MRSP data from the D087 database (used to build
up all MRSPs) was obtained from HQ AFMC/XP. For the F-15C, kit data file 0D240AA
was used. Kit file 1L2300A was used for the C-17A analysis. B-52H data came from the
kit data file 1C060BA. The kit files are text files with both peacetime and wartime data
for all items that might be assigned to an MRSP. They also include pre-specified buy
quantities for items the Air Force has deemed essential to the MRSP. This quantity is
flagged as the negotiated level quantity in ASM. Negotiated levels are set for some nonoptimized (NOP) items, which are items that are required by the Air Force but not used in
the optimization calculations. In addition, a generic run scenario is included with typical
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settings for an MRSP calculation run. No changes were made to the raw data in the kit
files.
The actual range and depth for each MRSP was determined by ASM. The files
include items which have pre-specifled quantities in the negotiated level field. Table 2
shows the total number of items for which data is included, the range and depth of the
items with negotiated levels, and the total cost of these parts. This total cost represents a
floor below which ASM will not buy.
Table 2: Negotiated Levels

Aircraft
F-15C
C-17A
B-52H

Total Items
467
233
249

Neg Lv Range
121
13
16

Neg Lv Depth
179
443
144

Total Neg Lv Cost
$6,960,610.92
$7,461,129.71
$10,240,071.85

The F-15C kit has the most number of items for consideration, but the total negotiated
level cost is lowest. The C-17A, the newest aircraft in the study, has the fewest total
items but the depth of negotiated items is the greatest. The B-52H has the highest
negotiated level cost of the three aircraft but the lowest negotiated level depth.

Aircraft Sustainability Model

The ASM program was installed on an Intel Celeron 400Mhz personal computer
running Microsoft's Windows Millennium Edition. Version 6.21 of the software was
used. ASM's interface is user-friendly and uses a database structure to manage the
various runs. Radio buttons allow options to be turned on and off, and numerical data is
entered in clearly labeled fields. Kit data is imported from the D087 raw file using the
Kit-* Import Kit Data-* Import USAF D087 Data command. The proper kit is chosen
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and ASM imports the data, converting it to ASM's file structure. An option to change
baseline kit parameters such as the number of aircraft and the flying profile is offered, but
was not used in this research. Changes to the flying profile and number of aircraft were
made to each scenario run rather than to the baseline kit file. This allowed the file to be
used for every run to maintain continuity of data. Once the baseline kit is created, the
user can move on to creating scenarios and running requirements computations.
Global Settings. Many options in ASM were set and then remained static throughout
the runs for all aircraft. On the "Parameters" page, the Asset Projection field was
changed to current and the Coverage Period was zero. Figure 11 shows the "Advanced
Parameters" page, which was not changed once it was set:

BBC:

Figure 11: Advanced Parameters

The starting assets field tells ASM to create a new kit without considering items that are
already in Air Force inventory. The Pre-specified buy quantity field forces ASM to use
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the negotiated levels discussed earlier. The Resupply fields force ASM to support the
aircraft without depot repair and resupply, which is the whole purpose of the MRSP
concept. In Other Options, exponential repair is more realistic and there is only one base
to support. The Variance to Mean Ratio was kept at 1.0 and the model was asked to
optimize the scenarios based on the expected number of aircraft NMCS at a certain day
or days.
Changing Variables. ASM has the option to run requirements for MRSPs based on
the input variables, or run evaluations on a pre-built MRSP supporting different
scenarios. We are examining the size and cost of kits for different scenarios, so the
model was used to run requirements computations and build new kits. This section
describes what variables were changed and why.
ASM uses total flying hours as the primary driver of demands for items (Kline, et
al, 1999: 2-13). The Scenario page allows the user to set the total flying hours for days 160 individually. This allows the establishment of surge and sustainment periods, or any
other scenario the user wishes to evaluate. Figure 12 shows a sample scenario page
(values shown are default values and were not used in the actual research). The NonWartime and Wartime fields are used when evaluating a pre-built MRSP and do not
affect requirements computations. This was verified by making numerous requirements
runs with different sortie rates and hours with no effect on the computed kit size.
Wartime demands were not decelerated for any aircraft. The flying hour profile for the
desired scenario is typed into the appropriate fields in the Wartime Flying Hours section.
The final step was naming the run number for future reference and then running the
requirements computation in ASM.
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Figure 12: Scenarios Page

One Base/Two Squadrons

The first theoretical deployment considered was that of two squadrons deploying
to the same location. In this case, baseline kits supporting 24 F-15C, 12 C-17A, and 12
B-52H aircraft were imported. The wartime flying hours were adjusted to create eight
different scenarios with a difference of 10 hours flying time between scenarios. The
requirements run shopping lists were then exported in Microsoft Excel format and
analyzed. The baseline kits were multiplied by two to simulate the arrival of two
squadrons from different bases. This is based on the assumption that demand rates for
the aircraft from different bases are the same.
To simulate a customized MRSP arriving from a centralized management facility,
an MRSP was created to support 48 F-15C, 24 C-17A, and 24 B-52H aircraft. The flying
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hours were doubled for each of the eight scenarios and then requirement runs were
created. The shopping lists were again exported to Excel and the differences between the
two runs were examined.
One important aspect of this scenario involves the impact of cannibalization on
the reduction in parts. The scenarios were run with full cannibalization, but in the first
case where each squadron brings its own kit the cannibalization occurs only within that
squadron. Conversations with maintenance officers indicate that squadrons would allow
cannibalization between squadrons if necessary. In the second case in which a kit for the
total number of deployed aircraft is created, ASM assumes full cannibalization for the
entire number of aircraft. The overall DSO remains the same, but there may be some
change. To investigate, another series of runs identical to the first was made with the
cannibalization flag switched to "none."

Centralized Intermediate Repair Facility (CIRF)
The second theoretical deployment involves the establishment of a CIRF
supporting several smaller detachments of aircraft in a forward operating location (FOL).
ASM version 6.21 has a preliminary CIRF analysis capability called the USAF FSL
function. It must be activated by editing the model.ini file and changing the UserType
field to UserType=USAFFSL. Once the model is restarted, the FSL option becomes
available. ASM uses the term Forward Support Location (FSL) for the CIRF, and FOL
for the bases in the FOL the aircraft are deployed to. This terminology will be used for
the remainder of the discussion.
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The FSL option is undocumented so the AFLMA provided information on its use.
It allows the assignment of pre-built MRSPs to FOLs and then calculates the parts
required if some were stored at the FSL and some stored at the FOLs. The options
available in the FSL page are shown in Figure 13
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Figure 13: FSL Options

The FSL to FOL ship time is the time it takes an item to travel from the FSL to the FOL,
and ASM assumes this is equal for all FOLs. The default value of five days was used for
all runs. Five days seemed to be a reasonable time frame and there was no conflicting
documentation to suggest otherwise. The resupply time from the depot was also kept at
the default 30 days. The FSL repair time assumes that some reduction in base repair
capability occurs, so the FSL repairs items based on the items' base repair time (BRT)
plus a constant. Again, the default value of two days was used. The LRU not-reparable
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this station (NRTS) rate is assumed to be the same as the items base NRTS rate, but the
SRU rate is set to 100% because the FSL does not have the same repair capabilities as a
depot. Finally, the RR LRU support was set to Stock - RR items stocked but not repaired
at FSL.
The first page of the FSL option is the kit selection screen. Kits are deselected by
filling in a small rectangle next to their name. Any unselected kits will be considered in
the analysis. The FSL option assumes that each FOL receives a kit, so if four kits are
assigned, then four FOLs will be assumed. For this situation we assumed the demands
and flying schedules at each FOL were identical, so one baseline MRSP was created and
then copied to produce the desired number of FOLs. After the run is made, ASM
generates an Excel output file in the IAF_Port folder of the ASM directory. This file has
four columns—NSN, fsl_target, folsumtarg, and tot_target. The fsl_target is the number
of each NSN assigned to the FSL. The folsumtarg is the total number of items assigned
to all the FOLs, and should be divided by the number of FOLs to determine how many
parts go to each FOL. The tot_target column is the total number of parts to be purchased.
The FSL output file NSNs are identical to the individual kit files, so when both
are sorted by NSN it was a simple task to import the item cost and LRU/SRU flag. A
template Excel file with the item data and LRU/SRU flags was created and the FSL
option data was imported. Calculations for the FSL total cost and number of LRUs and
SRUs were made. As in the first deployment considered, eight flying hour profiles were
created. The FSL option scenarios were be compared to a deployment in which each
squadron takes an individual MRSP with no intermediate repair facility. In this case,
cannibalization was not an issue because the FOLs are separated geographically.
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Once the scenarios were defined and ASM's parameters set to run requirements
computations for MRSP assets, the shopping lists and FSL totals were exported to Excel.
The data was manipulated to find total cost and reductions in total assets. The next
chapter describes the data analysis in detail.
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IV. Chapter 4—Analysis

Overview

This chapter reports the results of using ASM to determine the effect of a
theoretical centralized MRSP storage facility. The chapter is organized by aircraft type—
F-15C, C-17A, and B-52H. Each section begins with a discussion of the flying hour
scenarios for each aircraft and why they were chosen. The next section shows the unique
ASM parameters that changed for each aircraft according to Air Force doctrine or
mission specialty. Next, summarized ASM results for total cost, the range and depth of
parts, and a breakdown of LRUs/SRUs are shown, as well as differences between the
traditional deployment and the proposed centralized concepts. Finally, the same scenario
results are shown with cannibalization turned off to show the effects canning has on the
amount of assets in the MRSPs.
There are two items of interest shown in the results tables. The first is total
MRSP cost, which is reported by ASM and easily computed from the buy totals ASM
outputs for each run. Cost is important because the military has insufficient funds to
purchase all the assets it needs. Therefore, any cost savings resulting from the centralized
MRSP concept are significant. The second item of interest is the range and depth of parts
in the computed MRSPs, which directly affect the logistics footprint of the deployed
squadrons. The percentages of LRUs and SRUs are reported as well, which may provide
some insight into the makeup of the kits.
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F-15C

Flying Hour Profile Scenarios. The fighter aircraft representative has the highest
number of assets under review for inclusion in the MRSP. Recall that the F-l 5C MRSP
data contains both LRUs and SRUs, and some LRUs are RR or RRR. The flying hour
profile for the aircraft was derived from the default values found in the D087 file.
Fighter aircraft such as the F-15C face a surge period early in the deployment, and then a
longer sustainment phase with fewer flying hours per day. For the F-15C, the surge
period lasts 5 days and the sustainment period lasts until a pipeline is established at day
30. Table 3 shows the eight scenarios used during the research for a 24-aircraft squadron.
—. - .j— B

Day
1-5
6-30

Seen. 1

Seen. 2

Seen. 3

Seen. 4

Seen. 5

Seen. 6

Seen. 7

Seen. 8

52
25

62
35

72
45

82
55

92
65

102
75

112
85

122
95

A single F-15C flying in scenario 1 would fly 2.17 hours per day, while scenario 8 would
result in each aircraft flying 5 hours or per day during the surge period. The values for
scenario 4 are the D087 default values.
For the 48-aircraft scenarios, the flying hour profile values were doubled. Table 4
shows the eight scenarios used for 48 aircraft:
Tab le 4: *lyin 2 Hour Frcifile tor 48 F-15C
Day
1-5
6-30

Seen. 1

Seen. 2

Seen. 3

Seen. 4

Seen. 5

Seen. 6

Seen. 7

Seen. 8

104
50

124
70

144
90

164
110

184
130

204
150

224
170

244
190

The flying hour profiles result in the same sortie rates and hours as the 24-aircraft
scenarios. The scenarios place the same demands on the aircraft, and thus the parts in the
MRSPs, as two squadrons deploying with their own kits. The next section describes the
ASM parameters unique to runs involving the F-l 5C.
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ASM Parameters. The basic parameters page in ASM includes the Fleet Size, 1st
Analysis Day, and 2nd Analysis day fields. For the first set of runs, the Fleet Size was
set to 24 aircraft. The 1st Analysis day tells ASM what DSO the MRSP should support at
the end of the surge period, and the 2nd Analysis day does the same at the end of the
support period. For the F-15C, the default values from D087 were used. The 1st
Analysis day is day 5 and the DSO is 71.66%, or 17.2 available aircraft at the end of day
5. The 2nd Analysis day is day 30 with a DSO of 63.33%, or 15.2 aircraft available at
the end of day 30. For the second set of runs with 48 aircraft, the DSO percentages
remained the same, which changed the 1st Analysis availability goal to 34.4 aircraft and
the 2nd Analysis day goal to 30.4. Cannibalization was set to "Full" for this set of runs.
Results with Cannibalization. The first data set to report is the case of two 24-aircraft
squadrons deploying with their own MRSPs.
Table 5: Two 24 F-15C MRSPs
Scenario 8
Scenario 7
Scenario 1
Scenario 3
Scenario 6
Scenario 2
Scenario 4
Scenario 5
$16,621,552.16 $18,430,770.58 $21,063,598.44 $23,084,285.82 $25,713,813.70 $29,454,300.14 $33,024,477.90 $38,264,945.20

Total Cost
Range
Depth
% LRUs
% SRUs

%RR
% RRR

142
556

154
658

167
780

176
906

81.29%
18.71%
76.62%
23.38%

84.19%
15.81%
80.24%
19.76%

86.67%
13.33%
83.33%
16.67%

88.08%
11.92%
85.21%
14.79%

189

208

218

237

1066
87.80%
12.20%
85.37%
14.63%

1234
87.68%
12.32%
85.58%
14.42%

1438
87.48%
12.52%
85.54%
14.46%

1650
87.15%
12.85%
85.33%
14.67%

The next table shows the results of a custom MRSP designed to support all 48
aircraft:
Table 6: One 48 F-15C MRSP
Total Cost
Ranqe
Depth
% LRUs
% SRUs

%RR
% RRR

Scenario 8
Scenario 7
Scenario 1
Scenario 2
Scenario 3
Scenario 5
Scenario 6
Scenario 4
$10,954,161.19 $13,002,477.03 $15,577,981.39 $17,729,979.29 $20,542,407.13 $22,909,961.25 $26,075,228.17 $29,395,736.62

170
430

185
543

198
672

212
802

223
947

87.91%
12.09%
84.88%
15.12%

90.42%
9.58%
88.03%
11.97%

92.26%
7.74%
90.33%
9.67%

93.52%
6.48%
91.90%
8.10%

93.77%
6.23%
92.40%
7.60%

232

247

255

1090
93.94%
6.06%
92.75%
7.25%

1248
93.51%
6.49%
92.47%
7.53%

1418
92.74%
7.26%
91.82%
8.18%

Note again that the only item changed between the two sets of runs (for 24 and 48
aircraft) is the number of aircraft assigned to the base. The flying hours were doubled, so
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each aircraft flies the same profile in each scenario. Table 7 shows the differences in
total cost and total assets in the kits.
Table 7: F-15C Scenario Differences
Total Cost
Total Parts

Scenario 8
Scenario 7
Scenario 1
Scenario 6
Scenario 2
Scenario 3
Scenario 4
Scenario 5
$8,869,208.58
$6,949,249.73
$6,544,338.89
$5,667,390.97
$5,428,293.55
$5,485,617.05
$5,354,306.53
$5,171,406.57

126

115

104

108

119

232

190

144

The difference in total cost decreases from scenarios 1 to 5, but then quickly increases to
$8.8 million by scenario 8. Likewise, the number of parts in the kit decreases to scenario
5 and then nearly doubles by scenario 8. The customized MRSP from the centralized
storage area is cheaper and smaller than two kits from different bases in every scenario.
To test the effects of cannibalization on the reduction in assets, the scenarios were run
again with cannibalization turned off.
Results without Cannibalization. Tables 8 and 9 show the results after the
cannibalization flag was switched to "none:"
Table 8: Two 24 F-15C MRSPs without Cannibalization
Total Cost
Range
Depth
% LRUs
% SRUs

%RR
% RRR

Scenario 8
Scenario 7
Scenario 6
Scenario 1
Scenario 2
Scenario 3
Scenario 4
Scenario 5
$36,719,614.08 $44,703,751.20 $51,611,771.86 $57,976,595.82 $64,994,490.66 $71,985,193.90 $78,273,351.12 $84,570,415.02

384

389

393

394

395

396

396

396

1904
85.08%
14.92%
82.67%
17.33%

2300
85.91%
14.09%
83.39%
16.61%

2614
86.46%
13.54%
84.01%
15.99%

2960
87.16%
12.84%
84.80%
15.20%

3288
87.90%
12.10%
85.40%
14.60%

3566
88.50%
11.50%
85.98%
14.02%

3880
88.25%
11.75%
85.82%
14.18%

4182
88.57%
11.43%
86.18%
13.82%

Table 9: One 48 F-15C MRSP without Cannibalization
Total Cost
Ranqe
Depth
% LRUs
% SRUs

%RR
% RRR

Scenario 8
Scenario 7
Scenario 6
Scenario 1
Scenario 4
Scenario 5
Scenario 2
Scenario 3
$24,179,229.87 $30,303,388.87 $36,423,489.40 $42,279,930.59 $48,145,633.95 $54,040,210.22 $59,966,720.05 $65,576,753.82

388

391

393

396

396

396

396

396

1327
87.04%
12.96%
84.85%
15.15%

1655
87.61%
12.39%
85.56%
14.44%

1946
88.28%
11.72%
86.18%
13.82%

2228
88.87%
11.13%
86.76%
13.24%

2495
89.30%
10.70%
87.09%
12.91%

2765
89.58%
10.42%
87.41%
12.59%

3023
89.91%
10.09%
87.66%
12.34%

3281
90.06%
9.94%
87.90%
12.10%

The differences between the two kits are shown in Table 10.
Table 10: F-15C Differences without Cannibalization
Total Cost
Total Parts

Scenario 8
Scenario 7
Scenario 6
Scenario 1
Scenario 2
Scenario 3
Scenario 4
Scenario 5
$12,540,384.21 $14,400,362.33 $15,188,282.46 $15,696,665.23 $16,848,856.71 $17,944,983.68 $18,306,631.07 $18,993,661.20

577

645

732

668

45

793

801

857

901

In this case, there is still a sizeable savings gained with the development of a customized
MRSP. While much larger than the standard MRSPs, the centralized management
MRSPs still show a reduction in cost and footprint.

F-15C CIRF Analysis
Flying Hour Profiles. Chapter three discussed the application of ASM's FSL option to
the F-15C. This section reports the results of that analysis. The CIRF option was
designed for a scenario in which several small groups of aircraft are deployed throughout
a region of conflict. 24-aircraft groups were judged to be too large for a reasonable
analysis. A scenario with four 12-aircraft groups was designed. The total number of
deployed aircraft remains at 48. The flying hour profiles were originally reduced by half
from the 24-aircraft profiles, but this was judged to be too low for surge operations. The
final flying hour profiles are shown in Table 11:
Table 11:12 F-15C CIRF Flying Hour Profiles
Day
1-5

Seen. 1

Seen. 2

Seen. 3

Seen. 4

Seen. 5

Seen. 6

Seen. 7

31

41

51

61

71

81

91

101

6-30

17.5

27.5

37.5

47.5

57.5

67.5

77.5

87.5

Seen. 8

Scenario 1 involves a single aircraft flying 2.6 hours per day, and scenario 8 brings that
up to two 8.4 hours per day. The DSO at day five remained at 71.66%. The CIRF
section of chapter three discusses the other parameters.
Results with Cannibalization. The first set of data is the kit cost, depth, and range of
four individual MRSPs deployed with four 12-aircraft squadrons with no CIRF
established. Table 12 shows the results.
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Table 12: Four 12 F-15C MRSPs with No CIRF
Total Cost
Range
Depth

Scenario 7
Scenario 8
Scenario 1
Scenario 6
Scenario 2
Scenario 3
Scenario 4
Scenario 5
$38,423,127.36 $49,337,072.88 $61,574,682.16 $78.766,945.88 $98,716,792.04 $117,668,401.72 $135,124,065.80 $154,640,818.40
329
317
323
151
205
234
271
297
4168
3400
3812
1292
2528
2960
1664
2056

The next table shows the results of the establishment of a CIRF supporting the four FOLs
with 12 F-15C aircraft at each location.
Table 13: 48 F-15C with CIRF Results Summary
Total Cost
Total Parts

Scenario 8
Scenario 7
Scenario 1
Scenario 3
Scenario 4
Scenario 5
Scenario 6
Scenario 2
$6,008,128.37 $13,434,730.61 $22,692,881.27 $34,584,379.13 $47,299,079.13 $59,761,802.43 $70,221,877.35 $81,995,891.91
2023
2189
1733
240
1178
1470
532
805

Total Cost
FSL Range
FSL Depth
FOL Range
FOL Depth
Total Range
Total Depth

Scenario 1
Scenario 2
Scenario 3
$32.414,998.99 $35,902,342.27 $38,881,800.89
47
47
48
55
52
52
92
101
118
1000
1080
1196
165
139 ' -.
148
1052 m;» 'üiW1i32
1251

Table 14: CIRF vs. Four 12 F-15C Kits
Scenario 8
Scenario 7
Scenario 5
Scenario 6
Scenario 4
$57,906,599.29 $64,902,188.45 $72,644,926.49
$44,182,566.75 $51,417,712.91
49
48
48
48
48
65
71
59
54
58
189
171
142
161
127
1908
1724
1608
1296
1432
236
218
208
189
.;<.■■.• ■
174
1789
- .1979
1667
m
1350
1490

The savings resulting from the CIRF concept quickly rise as the flying hours increase.
By scenario 6, two CIRFs supporting 96 aircraft could be established for the cost of four
12-aircraftkits.
Table 15 shows the breakdown of assets by LRU and SRU for each concept.

FSL LRUs
FSL SRUs
FSL Total
4 Kit LRUs
4 Kit SRUs
4 Kit Total

rable 15: F-15C LRU/SRU Totals
Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 Scenario 4 Scenario 5 Scenario 6 Scenario 7 Scenario 8
1737
1927
1438
1615
1000
1080
1298
1199
52
52
52
52
52
52
52
52
, 1979
1789
1667
1350
1490
1052
1132
1251
3440
2760
3108
1964
2332
1040
1280
1580
728
704
640
384
564
628
252
476
4168
3812
3400
1292;
1664
2528
V 2960

* —mm

It shows that ASM assigns only 52 SRUs to the CIRF no matter what the flying hour
profile is, while the four kit totals steadily increase the number of SRUs. This is most
likely due to the way ASM deals with CIRF implementation. The FSL cannot repair
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SRUs, but it can and does repair a significant number of LRUs, and provides a risk
pooling effect that reduces the total number of stocked items.

C-17A

Flying Hour Profile Scenarios. The C-17A is the representative cargo aircraft. While
its role as a tactical airlifter holds some merit, the decision was made to model deployed
C-17s acting in a strategic, long-range cargo role. This was the default D-87 scenario as
well. The C-17 is expected to deploy supplies during the first days of the war, sustain
deployed forces, and then redeploy forces home after hostilities end. There is usually too
little airlift capacity, so the C-17 is tasked for as many hours as possible with no surge or
sustainment period. The flying hour profile reflects this, as it is a constant number of
hours from days 1 to 45. Table 16 shows the scenarios used for 12 deployed C-17s.
Table 16: Flying Hour Profile for 12 C-17A
Day
1-45

Seen. 1
145

Seen. 6
195

Seen. 7
205

Seen. 8
215

Table 17: Flying Hour Profile for 24 C-17A
Seen. 3
Seen. 5
Seen. 6
Seen. 2
Seen. 4
390
310
330
350
370

Seen. 7
410

Seen. 8
430

Seen. 2
155

Seen. 3
165

Seen. 4
175

Seen. 5
185

Table 17 shows the scenarios used for 24 deployed C-17s.
Day
1-45

Seen. 1
290

Again, the flying hours were doubled for the proposed centralized management concept.
Scenario 1 results in a single aircraft flying 12.1 hours per day, and scenario 8 results in
the aircraft flying 17.9 hours per day.
ASM Parameters. For the first set of runs, the Fleet Size was set to 12 aircraft. For
the C-17 A, the default values from D087 were used for the 1st Analysis day. No second
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analysis day is needed because the kit is designed to support the aircraft through day 45
of the war. The 1st Analysis day is day 45 and the DSO is 93.08%, or 11.17 available
aircraft at the end of day 45. For the second set of runs with 24 aircraft, the DSO
percentage remained the same, which changed the 1st Analysis availability goal to 22.34
aircraft. Cannibalization was set to "Full" for this set of runs.
Results with Cannibalization. The first data set to report is the case of two 12-aircraft
squadrons deploying with their own MRSPs.
Table 18: Two 12 C-17A MRSPs
Total Cost
Range
Depth
% LRUs
% SRUs
%RR
% RRR

Scenario 8
Scenario 1
Scenario 4
Scenario 6
Scenario 7
Scenario 2
Scenario 3
Scenario 5
$190,856,354.62 $200,076,460.78 $209,532,417.50 $218,237,954.78 $226,719,260.36 $235,968,589.74 $243,965,689.66 $252,902,571.66
233
233
233
233
233
233
233
233
3856
3940
3250
3372
3464
3554
3640
3746
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
0%
0%
0%
0%
0%
0%
0%
0%
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
0%
0%
0%
0%
0%
0%
0%
0%

The next table shows the results of a custom MRSP designed to support all 48 aircraft:
Table 19 :One24C-17AMRSP
Total Cost
Range
Depth
% LRUs
% SRUs
%RR
% RRR

Scenario 1
Scenario 8
Scenario 2
Scenario 3
Scenario 4
Scenario 5
Scenario 6
Scenario 7
$133,909,399.73 $141,895,202.35 $149,959,787.04 $157,579,551.48 $165,764,819.03 $173,406,904.20 $180,943,879.26 $189,050,774.61
233
233
233
233
233
233
233
233
2047
2631
2127
2454
2551
2213
2302
2375
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
0%
0%
0%
0%
0%
0%
0%
0%
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
0%
0%
0%
0%
0%
0%
0%
0%

Note again that the only item changed between the two sets of runs (for 12 and 24
aircraft) is the number of aircraft assigned to the base. The flying hours were doubled, so
each aircraft flies the same profile in each scenario. Table 20 shows the differences in
total cost and total assets in the kits.
Table 20: C-17A Scenario Differences
Total Cost
Total Parts

Scenario 7
Scenario 8
Scenario 1
Scenario 3
Scenario 6
Scenario 2
Scenario 4
Scenario 5
$63,851,797.05
$63,021,810.40
$56,946,954.89 $58,181,258.43 $59,572,630.46 $60,658,403.30
$60,954,441.33 $62,561,685.54
1305
1309
1203
1252
1292
1245
1251
1265

The difference in total cost increases steadily with the flying hours. The number of assets
in the kits also increases with flying hours. Note that because all the assets in the C-17A
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kit are LRUs the cost savings is quite substantial when compared to the F-15C scenarios.
The customized MRSP from the centralized storage area is cheaper and smaller than two
kits from different bases in every scenario. To test the effects of cannibalization on the
reduction in assets, the scenarios were run again with cannibalization turned off.
Results without Cannibalization. Tables 21 and 22 show the results after the
cannibalization flag was switched to "none:"
Table 21: Two 12 C-17A MRSPs without Cannibalization
Total Cost
Range
Depth
% LRUs
% SRUs
%RR
% RRR

Scenario 8
Scenario 1
Scenario 2
Scenario 3
Scenario 6
Scenario 7
Scenario 4
Scenario 5
$205,611,405.06 $215,620,347.14 $224,848,513.18 $234,003,185.20 $243,260,714.64 $253,034,373.08 $260,821,778.64 $269,711,086.64
233
233
233
233
233
233
233
233
4026
4126
3402
3514
3922
3610
3708
3816
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
0%
0%
0%
0%
0%
0%
0%
0%
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
0%
0%
0%
0%
0%
0%
0%
0%

Table 22: One 24 C-17A MRSP without Cannibalization
Total Cost
Range
Depth
% LRUs
% SRUs
%RR
% RRR

Scenario 1
Scenario 8
Scenario 2
Scenario 6
Scenario 7
Scenario 3
Scenario 4
Scenario 5
$156,634,831.36 $164,725,735.75 $173,022,913.09 $181,470,954.69 $188,777,630.36 $196,634,521.04 $204,236,590.00 $211,956,869.24
233
233
233
233
233
233
233
233
2907
2744
2824
2306
2393
2478
2567
2646
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
0%
0%
0%
0%
0%
0%
0%
0%
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
0%
0%
0%
0%
0%
0%
0%
0%

The differences between the two kits are shown in Table 23.
Table 23: F-15C Differences without Cannibalization
Total Cost
Total Parts

Scenario 8
Scenario 7
Scenario 1
Scenario 2
Scenario 5
Scenario 6
Scenario 3
Scenario 4
$56,399,852.04 $56,585,188.64 $57,754,217.40
$48,976,573.70
$50,894,611.39
$54,483,084.28
$51,825,600.09 $52,532,230.51
1202
1219
1096
1121
1141
1178
1132
1170

The C-17A's very high DSO of 93.08 keeps the cost and asset totals high even with
cannibalization, so turning off the cannibalization flag does not have much effect on the
kit totals.
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B-52H
Flying Hour Profile Scenarios. The B-52H is the bomber aircraft representative. The
flying hour profile for the aircraft was derived from the default values found in the D087
file. The B-52H file has a surge period of 21 days and a sustainment period from 22 to
30 days. The sustainment period involves only slightly fewer flying hours than the surge
period. Table 24 shows the eight scenarios used during the research for a 12-aircraft
squadron.
Table 24: Flying Hour Profile for 12 B-52H
Day
1-21
22-30

Seen. 1

34
32

Seen. 2

44
42

Seen. 3

54
52

Seen. 4

64
62

Seen. 5

74
72

Seen. 6

Seen. 7

Seen. 8

84
82

94
92

104
102

A single B-52H flying in scenario 1 would fly 2.83 hours per day, while scenario 8 would
result in each aircraft flying 8.67 hours or per day during the surge period. The values for
scenario 4 are the D087 default values.
The flying hour profile values were doubled for the 24-aircraft scenarios. Table
25 shows the eight scenarios used for 24 aircraft:
Table 25: Flying Hour Profile for 24 B-52H
Day
1-21
22-30

Seen. 1

68
64

Seen. 2

Seen. 3

Seen. 4

Seen. 5

Seen. 6

Seen. 7

Seen. 8

88
84

108
104

128
124

148
144

168
164

188
184

208
204

The flying hour profiles result in the same sortie rates and hours as the 12-aircraft
scenarios. The scenarios place the same demands on the aircraft, and thus the parts in the
MRSPs, as two squadrons deploying with their own kits. The next section describes the
ASM parameters unique to runs involving the B-52H.
ASM Parameters. For the first set of runs, the Fleet Size was set to 12 aircraft. The
default DSO values from D087 were kept. The 1st Analysis day is day 5 and the DSO is
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83.33%, or 10 available aircraft at the end of day 5. The 2nd Analysis day is day 30 with
a DSO of 83%, or 9.96 aircraft available at the end of day 30. For the second set of runs
with 24 aircraft, the DSO percentages remained the same, which changed the 1st
Analysis availability goal to 20 aircraft and the 2nd Analysis day goal to 19.92.
Cannibalization was set to "Full" for this set of runs.
Results with Cannibalization. The first data set to report is the case of two 12-aircraft
squadrons deploying with their own MRSPs.
Table 26: Two 12 B-52H MRSPs
Scenario 7
Scenario 8
Scenario 6
Scenario 1
Scenario 2
Scenario 3
Scenario 4
Scenario 5
$55,603,684.38 $73,801,789.52
$91,279,628.96 $108,262,458.42 $125255,913.90 $140,862,568.36 $157,852,609.58 $173,144,278.40
234
234
234
234
232
234
234
234
4048
3452
3778
1794
3152
2172
2502
2816
100.00%
100.00%
100.00%
100.00%
100.00%
100.00%
100.00%
100.00%
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%
100.00%
100.00%
100.00%
100.00%
100.00%
100.00%
100.00%
100.00%
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%

Total Cost
Range
Total Parts
% LRUs
% SRUs
%RR
% RRR

The next table shows the results of a custom MRSP designed to support all 24
aircraft:
Table 27: One 24 B-52H MRSP
Total Cost
Ranqe
Total Parts
% LRUs
% SRUs
%RR
% RRR

Scenario 7
Scenario 8
Scenario 5
Scenario 6
Scenario 1
Scenario 2
Scenario 3
Scenario 4
$30,954,389.23 $46,177,275.49
$61,087,98150 $75,824,571.78 $90,510,852.47 $104,639,332.74 $119,336,426.39 $134,069,997.49
216
213
210
154
200
206
179
189
2397
2146
1895
635
886
1398
1645
1139
100.00%
100.00%
100.00%
100.00%
100.00%
100.00%
100.00%
100.00%
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%
100.00%
100.00%
100.00%
100.00%
100.00%
100.00%
100.00%
100.00%
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%

Note again that the only item changed between the two sets of runs (for 12 and 24
aircraft) is the number of aircraft assigned to the base. The flying hours were doubled, so
each aircraft flies the same profile in each scenario. Table 27 shows the differences in
total cost and total assets in the kits.
Table 28: B-52H Scenario Differences
Total Cost
Total Parts

Scenario 8
Scenario 7
Scenario 1
Scenario 2
Scenario 5
Scenario 6
Scenario 3
Scenario 4
$39,074,280.91
$38,516,183.19
$32,437,886.64 $34,745,061.43 $36,223,235.62
$24,649,295.15 $27,624,514.03
$30,191,647.46
1651
1632
1557
1418
1507
1159
1286
1363
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The difference in total cost increases steadily from scenario 1 to scenario 8. Likewise,
the number of parts in the kit increases as flying hours increase. The customized MRSP
from the centralized storage area is cheaper and smaller than two kits from different bases
in every scenario. To test the effects of cannibalization on the reduction in assets, the
scenarios were run again with cannibalization turned off.
Results without Cannibalization. Tables 29 and 30 show the results after the
cannibalization flag was switched to "none:"
Table 29: Two 12 B-52H MRSPs without Cannibalization
Total Cost
Ranqe
Total Parts
% LRUs
% SRUs
%RR
% RRR

Scenario 8
Scenario 7
Scenario 6
Scenario 5
Scenario 3
Scenario 4
Scenario 1
Scenario 2
$85,101,265.94 $103,719,237.58 $121,704,174.62 $139,018,863.98 $156,077,188.68 $172,835,975.68 $189,533,000.08 $205,849,42420
235
235
235
235
235
234
235
235
4768
4480
4160
3838
3500
2412
2782
3168
100.00%
100.00%
100.00%
100.00%
100.00%
100.00%
100.00%
100.00%
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%
100.00%
100.00%
100.00%
100.00%
100.00%
100.00%
100.00%
100.00%
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%

Total Cost
Ranqe
Total Parts
% LRUs
%SRUs
%RR
% RRR

Scenario 8
Scenario 7
Scenario 6
Scenario 5
Scenario 4
Scenario 1
Scenario 2
Scenario 3
$65,955,450.75 $82,235,146.65 $98,023,726.43 $113,483,15826 $128,722,331.75 $144,172,41522 $158,673,674.44 $173,474,798.89
235
235
235
235
235
235
235
235
3689
3417
3155
2884
2593
1712
2020
2310
100.00%
100.00%
100.00%
100.00%
100.00%
100.00%
100.00%
100.00%
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%
100.00%
100.00%
100.00%
100.00%
100.00%
100.00%
100.00%
100.00%
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%

Table 30: One 24 B-52H MRSP without Cannibalization

The differences between the two kits are shown in Table 31.
Table 31: B-52H Differences without Cannibalization
Total Cost
Total Parts

Scenario 8
Scenario 7
Scenario 6
Scenario 5
Scenario 3
Scenario 4
Scenario 1
Scenario 2
$27,354,856.93 $28,663,560.46 $30,859,325.64 $32,374,625.31
$23,680,448.19 $25,535,705.72
$19,145,815.19 $21,484,090.93
1079
1063
1005
907
954
762
858
700

As with the other aircraft, there is a sizeable savings gained with the development of a
customized MRSP. While much larger than the standard MRSPs, the centralized
management MRSPs computed without cannibalization still show a reduction in cost and
footprint.
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V. Conclusions and Recommendations

Overview

The need to reduce MRSP size and cost has never been greater. Air Force units
are being tasked to support contingencies around the world, and the speed and range of
airlift has made it the transport of choice. This thesis has examined a unique approach to
reducing the spares requirements of deployed squadrons. This chapter will present the
conclusions based on Chapter IV ASM analysis and examine some aspects of the
research that may have affected the results. It concludes with suggestions for future
research in this area.

Conclusions

Various scenarios involving multiple squadrons of aircraft from separate bases
were used to test the concept of the centralized MRSP management facility. The idea
that customizing the MRSPs could produce some sort of economies of scope was the
basic premise behind this testing methodology. We found, for the MRSP files analyzed,
there is a significant reduction in total cost and total assets needed to support the same
flying profile requirements. Table 32 summarizes the percent decrease in cost and parts
required for each aircraft.
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Table 32: Percent Savings

Aircraft

% Cost

% Parts

F-15C
C-17A

24.9

14.5

27.5

35.2

B-52H

30.7

50.7

The average savings for the F-15C was $6.2 million and 142 parts over the eight
scenarios. Savings for the C-17A averaged $60.7 million and 1,265 parts, and the B-52H
averaged $32.9 million for 1,447 parts. These savings are quite significant, especially for
the C-17A and B-52H, where every asset in the MRSP is an LRU. Many LRUs are
expensive, and thus are in limited supply. These results show that establishment of a
centralized facility will allow more LRUs to be pushed back out to the individual bases
for operating stock, while still providing optimal support to deployed units supported by
customized MRSPs.
Cannibalization is a major factor affecting the size and cost of the MRSPs. The
ASM analysis shows the kit size increases when cannibalization is not allowed, but the
savings resulting from centralized management are still present. Table 33 shows the
percent savings of the analysis without cannibalization.
Table 33: Percent Savings without Cannibalization

Aircraft

% Cost

% Parts

F-15C
C-17A
B-52H

27.5
22.6
18.4

24.9
30.8
25.6
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The average savings for the F-15C jumped to $16.2 million and 747 parts. The C-17A
and B-52H showed slight drops in average savings at $53.7 million and 1,157 parts and
$26.1 million at 916 parts, respectively. These results show that even without the aircraft
availability gained by cannibalization a customized MRSP targeted for the exact number
of deployed aircraft will yield the same support at a lower cost and size than would an
MRSP managed in the traditional manner.
The F-15C FSL analysis shows an even more impressive result. Figure 14 shows
a plot of the cost of four individual MRSPs and the plot of the FSL, or CIRF option.
FSL Cost vs. 4 Kit Cost
(Millions)
$180

$160
$154.64
$140
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^k. $82 .PC

$80

$72.64

$60

$40

$38.42

$20

$0
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Scenario 2

Scenario 3

Scenario 4

Scenario 5

Scenario 6

Scenario 7

Scenario 8

Scenario

Figure 14: CIRF vs. 4 Kits

The triangle-marked line in Figure 14 is the difference between the two concepts.
Around scenario 6, the cost to send four MRSPs to the FOL is more than twice as
expensive as the establishment of a CIRF. Essentially, 96 aircraft could be supported by
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two CIRFs for the cost of supporting only 48 aircraft with individual MRSPs. If a CIRF
support concept is the expected support option for an AEF deployment, then a centralized
MRSP management facility would be able to quickly build up and deploy the FOL and
FSL packages for the entire region.

Factors Affecting Research
Perhaps the largest factor affecting the research was the use of raw D087 MRSP
files for the starting point of the ASM runs. The F-15C data included LRUs and SRUs in
both the RR and RRR types. ASM uses these values to determine what items can be
repaired at the FSL and where to stock them. The C-17A and B-52H MRSP files did not
have any items that the FSL option could evaluate, so no CIRF analysis could be
accomplished on those aircraft. If military planners decide a CIRF support plan is an
option for the C-17 and B-52, then different data files will be needed to run a proper
analysis.
Another difficulty faced when using the FSL option was the undocumented nature
of the option. The current version of ASM does not have a fully implemented FSL
capability. As such, no information about exactly how the option functions was
available. Agencies such as AFLMA and LMI are using the option, so it was believed to
be useful to this research. Results should be viewed with the understanding that a final
implementation may affect the outcome.
Unfortunately, not every flying hour scenario could be run in the limited amount
of time the research was accomplished. Different surge and sustainment periods and
even different DSO figures may show larger or smaller cost savings. The research did
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include three general types of flying profiles: high surge/low sustainment (F-15C),
steady-state (C-17A), and high surge/slightly lower sustainment (B-52H). In all cases,
the custom MRSPs showed cost and size reductions. This leads us to suspect that
different scenarios will show varying degrees of savings, but rarely, if ever, increased
cost or size.

Future Research

This thesis examined a groundbreaking concept by supporting MRSPs through
centralized management. No information about centralized MRSP management was
found during the literature review. Conversations with other researchers and supply
managers did not indicate that any research efforts had been aimed at exploring the
options. As a result, there are numerous avenues for expanding the research in this area.
One area mentioned briefly in this thesis but not pursued was the savings in
manpower costs and overhead by removing the WRM elements at the base supply level.
Assets are constantly moving in and out of non-deployed MRSPs due to their higher
priority level. This keeps a large percentage of personnel busy replenishing,
inventorying, and issuing parts from the kits. In addition, the large containers used to
house the assets consume valuable warehouse space. A real-world survey and cost
analysis of the operating overhead required by such facilities would provide further
insight into the viability of centralized MRSP management.
Another potential area for research is the examination of optimal placement of the
centralized management facility (or facilities). Some discussions have suggested the
facility be placed at the depot for whatever aircraft is being supported. Others suggest
58

regional centers based on geographic locations, such as east coast, west coast, USAFE,
and PACAF. Another idea is to support multiple types of aircraft from one "superkit,"
where the airlift support comes through and picks up all the assets needed for aircraft
deployed in the region of conflict.
This thesis was a theoretical exercise. While actual demand data was used for the
runs, the scenarios used did not specify bases or actual real-world flying scenarios. Data
on flying hours/mission profiles from real-world operations or exercises may be the next
step in the research. In addition, use of actual base demand data and the number of realworld MRSPs for each aircraft type would contribute greatly to the understanding of the
usefulness of the centralized concept.
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Appendix A: Acronym Definitions
AEF

■ Aerospace Expeditionary Force

AFLMA

• Air Force Logistics Management Agency

AFR

Air Force Regulation

APS

Afloat Planning System

ASM

- Aircraft Sustainability Model

BRT

Base Repair Time

CIRF

Centralized Intermediate Repair Facility

DDR

Daily Demand Rate

DRT

Depot Repair Time

DSO

Direct Support Objective

EBO

Expected Backorders

EOQ

Economic Order Quantity

FOL

Forward Operating Location

FSL

Forward Support Location

GAO

General Accounting Office

LMI

Logistics Management Institute

LRU

Line-Replaceable Unit

METRIC

Multi-Echelon Technique for Recoverable Item Control

MOOTW

Military Operations Other Than Warfare

MRSP

Mobility Readiness Spares Package

MTW

Major Theater War

NOP

Non-Optimized
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NMCS

~ Not Mission Capable-Supply

NRTS

~ Not Repairable This Station

OST

- Order and Ship Time

PACAF

— Pacific Air Forces

PBR

-- Percent Base Repair

PLQ

— Pipeline Quantity

POS

-- Peacetime Operating Stock

QPA

~ Quantity Per Aircraft.

RCQ

~ Repair Cycle Quantity

RET

~ Retrograde Time

RCT

~ Repair Cycle Time

RTS

— Repaired This Station

SRU

~ Shop-Replaceable Unit

TLAM

~ Tomahawk Land Attack Missile

TSR

— Total System Requirement

USAFE

— US Air Forces Europe

WMP

~ War and Mobilization Plan
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